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Introduction
Much, if not most, of the interaction between an individual and his
environment involves dealing with classes or categories of things.

The

tremendous diversity one encounters in everyday life is necessarily coded
into a smaller number of categories to simplify the environment.

The

process by which concepts are acquired and used are of typical interest
to psychologists.
In concept attainment problems an arbitrary scheme (e.g.
rule) combines certain attributes to define a concept.

con~unct1ve

The subject is

required to discover the concept through an inductive process based on the
observation of a set of positive and negative inetances.

Infol'llation

about the correct concept is presented in bits and pieces, on a trial-bytrial basis, until the subject arrives at the solution.
One of the oldest questions in problem solving concerns comparisons
of group and individual efforts.

Within thia general area, the concept

of social facilitation is central, but over the past aeveral decades
previous research has given conflicting results:

compared with the solu-

tions arrived at by individuals working in isolation, problem solving in
a group is sometimes facilitative and sometimes inhibiting_

Hare (1962)

rather unspectacularly concluded that "the presence of others working on
the same task has been found to stimulate some individuals to greater
productivity, distract others, and leave others tmaffected." The group
situation may either increase an individual's activity if he is motivated
by implied competition, or depress activity through distraction, conformity
to norms, or group resistance to the task.

-1-

"Most studies can be seen as
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dealing with the same fundamental problem of identifying the factors whic:h
define optimal condition. for maximum productivity in problem solving
(Van de Geer and Jaspers, 1966)."
A nUllber of studies have been concerned with how the skills of the
group members combine.

Although there is some evidence (Ryack, 1965) for

a pooling model, it seems that the group problem situation 18 typically
more than just a combination of individuals who jWlt ha,pen to be in a
group.

In this respect, Hall, Mouton, and Blake '(1963) showed in tasks

requiring several complex judgements, that interacting groups were significantly superior to the pooled _cores of the separate individuals.

That

there may, under certain circumatances, also be an interactive effect on
the abilitie_ of individual members was demon_trated by Goldman (1965),
who found that the partner of lower ability in a two-man group increased
hi_ ability as a result of the group problem solving experunce.

Thus,

a task such as concept attainment in which there is room for contll1.derablc
improvement in the abilities of the individual members may get an added
impetus due to the increase in problem solving skill of low ability
members.

Under these circumstances a simple pooling model is inadequate

for predicting performance.

Thomas and Fink (1961) indicated that a

pooling ("independence") model may be applicable for complex tasks, however,
if discussion or communication between group members was not

po.sib1e--o~

not allowed.
Attempts to relate the outcome of a group's problem _olving efforts
to the ability of the group membefs have been beset by two

o.. ie

problema:

differences in talk demands of the many types of problems used, and the
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consequent difficulty of specifying the particular abilities relevant to
the tasks.

While it may be true, for example, that mathmatical reasoning

scores on general intelligence tests are positively correlated with
individual success on deductive reasoning

problems~

they are completely

uncorrelated with success on certain sudden insight problems.

Boffman

(1965) has brought up these difficulties and noted that experimental
evidence as to any relationship between member ability and group proficiency
is inconsistant.
Apart from the differences between individual and

g~oup

and the way

in which the abilities of the group members combine, several other factors

have been examined in group studies.

"Two factors appear to stand jut as

facilitating effective problem solving:

the members' motivation to work

cooperatively on the problem, and the diversity of the points of view and
information relevant to the problem within the group (Boffman. 1965)."
Boffman (1961) has attributed the auece8s

ot heterogeneous

gra~ps

in

problem solving to the presence of more different kinds of ideas or
different possible directions available for approaching the problem.

But

unless given a free atmosphere"in the group. the right solution may b~
suppressed (Maier & Solem. 1952).
exists in a group, the
ideas are to be

.~ried

communl~ated

It is apparent that even when

viewpoints are not always

If all

and considered by the group then, it is

important that they be aired and discussed.
area-~hich

heard~

dive~.ity

The best known factor in this

has not been too clearly distinguished from social facilitation--

has to do with the effeet of brainstOrming instructions on effective and
creative problem solving.
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Osborn (1953) offered the brainstorming technique in which an eva1uationfree period of idea production helps prevent discard of potentially good
solutions before all ideas are in.

The technique has been used primarily

in applied research,and since there have been no experimental tests of
the superiority of brainstorming to free discussion in the problem solving
situation it is very difficult to evaluate.

The value of discussion of

some sort to effective problem solving, though, is unquestionable.
In the concept attainment situation, where the complex nature of the
task makes a long-range, in-depth view of the situation particularly
beneficial, the effects of discussion are most important.
Most studies of conceptual behavior have employed one or another
variation of what has been called the reception paradigm--in which the
experimenter successively presents stimuH. to the sub.iect.

A more recent

and widely used methodological development is the selection paradigm, owing
largely to the work of Bruner, et a1. (1956).

In this situaUon the subject

is presented with an array of cards varying in number of attributes (shape,
color, etc.) with two or more values of each attribute (triangle or square,
red or green, etc.).

The experimenter then arbitrarily designates a

combination of two or more values as a concept, and indicates an initial
card satisfying this concept.

The subject's task is to then determine

the pre-designated combination by choosing a series of cards, learning
whether or not each card exemplifies the concept, and thus solving the
problem in as few card choices as possible (Laughlin and McGlynn, 1968).
In contrast to the reception technique,

'~ere

the subject is in a

sense at the mercy of the experimenter (Bourne, 1966)," in the selection
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paradigm the subject gathers information on his own.

This technique makes

it possible to determine from stimulus selections (and corresponding
hypotheses) whether or nbt the subject is using any systematic plan of
attack or strategy in the problem.

If he knows how to go about it, he can

use very effective strategies, and acquire the necessary information in a
minimum number of trials (Bourne, 1966).
Bruner et al. (1956) distinguished between two basic strategies,
Focusing and Scanning, in the concept attainment situation.

In scanning,

the subject tests specific hypotheses either singly (successive scanning),
all at once (simultaneous scanning), or some intermediate number.

While

simultaneous scanning is the theoretically optimal strategy to minimize card
choices to solution, it has been found too difficult for most people to use
because of excessive inference and memory demands.

As a result, many

persons adopt a strategy of focusing in which attributes rather than specific
hypotheses are tested.

In focusing, the subject tests the relevance of all

the possible hypotheses concerning a particular attribute or attributes by
choosing a card differing in one (conservatiVe focusing} or more (focus
gambling) attributes from a positive focus card.

A positive choice card

indicates that the value changed is irrelevant to the concept, a negative
choice card that it is essential.

Memory and inference requirements are

thus lessened, which Bruner at al. interpret as the explanation for focusing
being generally a more effective strategy.

Laughlin (1965, 1966) has

formulated quantitative rules for the scoring of focusing and scanning
strategies for conjunctive problems.
Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) have note4 that although this paradigm
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has been applied primarily to studies of individual cognitive processes,
recent studies have related it to group problem solving.

Laughlin (1965)

found that two person cooperative groups required fewer card choices to
solution, had fewer untenable hypotheses, and adopted a focusing strategy
more than individuals.

After application of the Taylor-McNemar correction

model (1955) the group superiority in terms of card choices was no longer
found, but their advantage in terms of focusing strategy remained.
Laughlin and Doherty (1967) analyzed this group superiority in terms
of the relative influence of discussion and memory factors, comparing
conditions in which discussion and paper were or were not allowed to
cooperative pairs.

Discussion groups solved the problems in fewer card

choices and fewer untenable hypotheses than groups not allowed discussion;
memory had no effect.

Complex relationships were found for the adoption

of focusing and scanning strategi.s in the interactions of discussion,
memory, stimulus display, and rule difficulty.
T,le effects of discussion were made clear when Laughlin and McGlynn
(1968) found that two cooperative individuals were more effective in
problem solving than ewo competitive individuals in terms of number of card
choices to solution, fewer untenable hypotheses, and more use of focusing
strategy t although they required more time.

Through discussion the

cooperative pairs were able to monitor and evaluate each other's card
choices and hypotheses and develop the empirically more effective focusing
strategy.

Cooperative groups were thus found to hold the same advantage

over competitive groups as groups over. ind:1..viduals.

No sex differ.ences

were found in problem solving performances or the use of strategies,
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although males required more time.

This was taken to indicate that usual

male superiority in problem solving

(Dunca~

1961; Van de Geer & Jaspers,

1966) may be due to motivation rather than capacity.

It was concluded that

the concept attainment situation was sufficiently interesting for females
to motivate their performance on a level with males.
In the Laughlin and McGlynn study, a steady imporvament over five
problems was found in terms of number of card ch0ices.

fO~1sin8

strategy,

and number of untenable hypotheses which was attributed to a social
facilitation effect found in both cooperative and competitive pairs.

But

this finding represents a departure from the continuity of this line of
research.

Laughlin and Jordan (1967) had noted that interprob1em transfer

did commonly take place with experimenter programming of instance or
reception strategies (e.g. Neisser & Weene, 1962; Wells, 1962; Wells &
Watson, 1965; Haygood & Bourne, 1965) and did not occur with subject
selection of instances (e.g. Bruner et a1., 1956; Conant & Trabasso, 1964;
Laughlin, 1966).

And the Laughlin and Jordan and Laughlin and Doherty

studies have supported

t~is

observation.

But the interproblem trausler

found by Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) raised a new question as to whether
relection paradigm studies could, in fact, commonly expect to find no
interprob1em transfer effects.
The existence of discussion as an aid in concept attainment is clear

.

(Laughlin & Doherty, 1967; Laughlin & McGlynn, 1968). but there is question
as to'how this process effects t~e improvement, or advantage, over nondiscussion situations.
Thus, the present experiment investigated interprob1em transfer effects
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and the role of discussion in the concept attainment situation.

Thfs was

accomplished by varying the amount of discussion al.lowed to cooperative
groups on three conjunctive problems.

It was expected that increasing

amounts of discussion would result in more efficient problem solving in
terms of greater use of focusing strategy, fewer untenable hypotheses, and
fewer card choices to solution.

Analysis of the effects of discussion was

made both in terms of problems and hypotheses.
Method
Desi~

and subjects.

A 3 x 3 x 3 repeated measures factorial design

was used with the variables:

(1) discussion allowed on problems (first,

first and second, all three); (2) discussion allowed on hypotheses (first
two, first four, first six), (3) problems (three for each pair of subjects).
Subjects were 180

students (90

m~le

and 90 female) from two Chicago

schools, Mundelein College and Loyola University.

Ten like-sex pairs (half

male, half female) were randomly assigned to each of the nine experimental
conditions.
Stimulus display and problems.

The stimulus display was exactly the

same as that used by Laughlin and McGlynn (1968):
posterboard containing an 8 x 8
colored ink with dark outlines.

ar~ay

a 28 x 44 inch white

of 64 2 1/4 x 4 inch cards drawn in

The 64 cards represented all possible

combinations of six attributes with two levels of each.

'11le display consisted

of all combinatic:·ns of six plus and/or minus signs in a row.

In order to

facilitate reference to the six positions, each was a different color, so
that the color name was the attribute and plus or minus the value of each
color.

The 64 cards were arranged systematically in relation to the other
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cards, for example, the

fi~st

minus in the bottom four.

color (blue) was plus in the top four rows,

The problems were conjunctive concepts with

three relevant attributes (e.g. ''blue minus, green plus, red plus").

Each

problem and initial card for each pair of subjects was randomly assigned
from the set of

three-~ttribute

conjunctive concepts and the subset of

possible initial cards for each subject.
Procedure.

All pairs solved three problems.

The meaning of conjunctive concepts was thoroughly

explained to the subjects, and the concept rule was typed on a reference
card accessible to them throughout the experiment.

The instructions

explained the nature of the task, pointed 011t the systematic arrangement of
the attributes and values on the display, and emphasized that the problems
were to be solved in as few card choices as possible, regardless of time
(Laughlin, 1964).
All pairs were told to work together and that they could discuss the
problems and their card choices and hypotheses.

1bey were told to alternate

in actually selecting each card and stating the accompanying hypothesis ••.
"because at some point during the problem I will stop the discussion after
which you may not communicate except to state your card choices and hypotheses in turn."
The person who selected the first card and made the first hypothesis
was determined by a coin flip before the first problem.

Subjects then

alternated in starting off the second and third problems.
Results
Four response meaSur.88 were analyzed:

number of card choices to

solution, focB;3ing strategy, percentage of untenable hypotheses, and
time to solution.
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Card choices to
-

solution.

The mean number of card choices to selution

for the nine treatment groups for each of the three problems are presented
in Table 1.

A summary of the analysis of variance is pres@nted in Table 2.

The effect of problems (the number of problems on which discussion
was allowed) was significant at the .001 level, F (2,81) • 8.617.
multiple-range comparisons were performed on the three problem
summing over the three hypotheses conditions.

Duncan

~ondition8

Discussion on two problems

was significantly superior to discussion on just one problem

(~<:.05).

And discussion on all three problems was significantly superior both to
discussion on two problems

(~<.001)

and to diseussion on one problem

The analysis of variance also revealed a significant effect for
hypotheses (the number of hypotheses on which discussion was allowed),
F (2,81) • 4.9547, ~ (.01.

Duncan multiple-range comparisons were per-

formed on the three hypotheses conditions summing over the three problem
conditions.

There was a progressive improvement in the number of card

choices to solution, varying directly with the number of hypotheses on
wh~ch

diseussion was allowed.

Discussion on four hypotheses required

aignificant1y fewer card choiees than discussion on two hypotheses

(~<.Ol).

Discussion on three hypotheses required significantly fewer choices than
either four

(~<.OS)

or

two (~<.OOl)

hypotheses.

There was no significant

effect on card choices due to trials (first, second, and third probleitts):
None 'of the interactions were significant.
Focusing Strategy.

The rulcs for scoring focusing strategy were

taken from Laughlin (1965) and Laughlin and Jordan (1967).
in detail below.

They are given
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Table 1
Mean Number of Card Choices for the Nine
Discussion Conditions for Three Trials
Discussion
Problems-Hypotheses

Trials
1

2

3

Total

one-two

5.4

6.6

5.8

17.80

one-four

5.<;

6.9

5.3

16.70

one-six

4.8

4.7

4.9

14.40

two-two

5.2

5.4

4.5

15.10

two-four

4.4

5.1

4.8

14.30

two-::;;ix

4.8

3.5

4.0

12.30

three-two

4.7

5.0

4.8

14.50

three-four

4.5

4.1

3.4

12.01')

three-six

4.4

3.8

3.5

11.70

Total

4.86

5.01

4.56

14.43
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Table 2
Summary of Analysis of Variance for
Card Choices to Solution
Source

df

55

MS

Problems (P)

2

80

40.0

8.617···

Hypotheses (H)

2

46

23.:1

4.9547··

P x H

4

9

81

376

Trials (T)

2

10

5.0

TxP

4

11

2.75

TxH

4

16

4.0

Tx P x H

8

12

1.5

162

658

Error (B)

Error (W)

•• ~ <.01
••*I? <.001

F

2.25
4.5420

4.()67

1.23
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Rule 1:

Each card choice had to obtain information on one new attribute.

';ew information was obtained if the card choice altered either one attribute

not previously proven irrelevant (conservative focusing), or more than one
attribute (focus gambling), providing that in altering more than one
attribute, the instance was either positive or that the ambiguous information
was correctly resolved on the next card choice by Altering only one
attribute.

Rule 2:

If a hypothesis was made it

ering the information available.

h~d

tr be tenable consid-

tmtenable hypothe.es were of three types:

(a) a hypothesis for a value of an attribute when the other value had
previously occurred on a positive instance; (b) a hypothesis which had
previously occurred on a negative instance. and (c) a repetition of a
previously given hypothesis.
Each card choice and accompanying hypothesis that satisfied these rules
was counted as an instance of focusing, and the total number of such instances was divided by the total number of card choices to derive a focusing
score on a continuum from .00 to 1.00.
The mean focusing scores for the nine treatment groups for each of the
three problems are presented in Table 3.

A summary of the analysis of

variance is presented in Table 4.
The analysis revealed a significant effect of discussion over problems,
F (2,81) • 9.1925,
performed on the
conditions.

~~

.001.

Duncan mUltiple-range comparisons were

thr~~ p~oblem co~ditions

summing over the three hypotheses

Discussion on two problems proved to be significantly superior

in terms of focusing scores than discussion on just one problem (~<.OOl).
And discussion on three problems was significantly more conducive to higher
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Table 3
Mean Focusing Scores for the Nine
Discussion Conditions for Three Problems
Discussion
Problems-Hypotheses

Trials
1

2

3

Total

one-two

.486

.341

.423

1. 250

one-four

.IJ49

.291

.511

1.251

one-sIx

.453

.468

.513

1.434

two-two

.472

.421

.495

1.388

two-four

.630

.641

.447

1.718

two-six

.479

.714

.562

1.755

three-two

.626

.572

.536

1. 734

three-four

.635

.719

.716

2.'170

three-!,ix

.498

.(;67

.699

1.864

Total

.525

.537

.545

1.607
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Table 4
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Focusing
Source

df

S8

MS

F

Problems (P)

2

1.6712

.8356

9.1925***

Hypotheses (H)

2

.3366

.1683

1.8515

P x H

4

.2017

.0504

81

7.3669

.0909

Trials

2

.()171

• ()O86

Tx P

4

.4287

.1072

1 • .5163

TxH

4

.4267

.1067

1.5092

T x E x H

8

.3800

.0475

162

11.4509

.0707

Error (B)

Error (W)
***:2. <.001
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focusing scores than both discussion on two problems
(~<.

on one problem only

i)Ol).

(~<.Ol)

and discussion

There were no significant effects due to

hypotheses or trials.
Untenable hypotheses.

The mean percentages of untenable hypotheses

for the nine treatment groups for each of the three problems are presented
in Table 5.

A summary of the analysis of variance is presented in Table 6.

The analysis of variance revealed a significant effect for hypotheses,
F (2,81) • 4.231,

~

<.115.

Duncan multiple-range comparisons were perfo-rmed

on the three hypotheses conditions summing over the three problem conditions.
Discussion on six hypotheses was found to reduce significantly the pe=centage of untenable hypotheses as compared with discussion on four hypotheses

(P.:<

.~1l)

and discussion on just two hypotheses (~(.001).

The difference

between four hypotheses and two hypotheses, however, was not significant.
There were no other significant main effects and there were no significant
interactions.
Time

~

solution.

The mean time to solution (in minutes) for the nine

discussion groups for each of the three problems is presented in Table 1.
A summary of the analysis of variance is presented in Table 8.
The analysis of variance revealed a significant effect for trials,
F (2,162) • 29.5633,

~<.OOl.

Duncan multiple-range comparisons between

problems revealed that the second problem required significantly less time
to solve than the first

(~<:.001),

and the third problem required significant-

ly less time to solve than either the second (~(.001) or the first (~<.OOl).
There were no other signi.icant main effects and there were no significant
interactions.
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Table 5
Mean Untenable Hypotheses Ratios for the Nine
Discussion Conditions for Three Problems
Discussion
Problems-Hypotheses

Trials
1

2

3

Total

one-two

.259

.451

.353

1.063

one-four

.377

.329

.239

9.45

one-six

.178

.219

.239

6.36

two-two

.333

.302

.241

8.76

two-six

.223

.195

.222

6.40

three-two

.254

.~83

.331

8.68

three-four

.162

.168

.195

5.25

three-six

.251

.093

.158

5.02

Total

.246

.~56

.248

7.50
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Table 6
Summary of Analysis of Variance for
Untenable Hypotheses
Source

df

~

MS

F

Problems (P'

2

.3144

.1572

2.2172

Hypotheses (8)

2

.6007

.3004

4.231*

P x H

4

.1058

.0266

81

5.7421

.0709

Trials (T)

2

.0055

.0029

TxP

4

.1072

.0268

Tx H

4

.1038

.0260

TxPxH

8

.3448

.0431

7.0235

.0433

Error (B)

Error (W)
*1'(.05

162
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Table 7
Mean Times to Solution for the Nine
Discussion Conditions for Three Problems
Discussion
Problems-Hypotheses

Trials
1

2

3

Total

one-two

12.1

10.1

7.2

29.4

one-four

11.9

10.0

5.2

27.1

one-::;:i'S{

10.0

5.8

4.7

20.6

two-two

10.6

7.7

4.7

23.0

two-four

9.6

7.6

6.2

23.4

two-six

12.4

6.1

4.7

23.2

three-two

11.2

8.8

7.0

27.0

three··four

9.9

7.0

5.1

22.0

three-six

10.4

7.2

6.4

24.0

Total

10.91

7.81

5.69

24.41
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Table 8
Summary of Analysis of Variance
for Time to Solution
Source

df

SS

MS

Problems (P)

2

31. 341

15.6705

Hypotheses (II)

2

75.652

37.8260

P x H

4

105.704

26.4261

81

2,990.566

36.9206

Trials (T)

2

1,241. 564

Tx P

4

28.725

7.1814

Tx H

4

53.081

13.2703

Tx P x H

8

63.653

7.'1456

162

3,401. 734

20.9984

Error (B)

Error (\:.J')
•••~ (.001

620. 782

F

1.0245

29.5633···
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Correlations between the response measures (card choices to solution,
focusing strategy, untenable hypotheses, and time to solution) over all
conditions, both for individual problems and summing over the three trials,
are presented in Table 9.
Discussion
The major purpose of this experiment was to examine tlle role of
discussion in the concept attainment situation.

Previous evidence had well

established its importance in group problem solving (e.g. Hoffman, 1961;
Maier & Solem, 1952).

Basically the results were as expected:

increasing

amounts of discussion had significant effects in facilitating the problem
solving process.

This was indicated by decreasing numbers of card choices,

incressing focusing scores, and decreasing numbers of untenable hypotheses.
Laughlin and Doherty (1967) and Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) had also noted
the importance of discussion in concept attainment with similar results.
As Laughlin and Doherty (1967) had noted, the benefits of discussion
seem to involve an inference and monitoring process, in which the two
persons can both reason concerning the meaning of each card choice and
hypothesis and check each other.

Through discussion they can reduce

erroneous inference and insure more efficient card choices, thus solving
the problems in fewer card choices and making fewer untenable hypotheses.
The differing effects of discussion over problems and discussion over
hypotheses found in this experiment offer an explanation of the discussion
process in concept attainment.

As discussion was allowed over more hypotheses

the number of card choices to solution decreased and the percentage of
untenable hypotheses decreased.

As disaussion was allowed over more problems,

the card choices to solution decreased and the incidence of focusing
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Table 9
Intercorrelations of Response Measures
Individual Problems
Card Choices

Focusing

-.67

Focusing

Un. Hypotheses

.67

.59

-.70

-.39

Un. Hypotheses
SumminS Over Problems
Card ChoieflS
Focusing
Un. Hypotheses

Time

.33
Focusing
-.71

Un. Hypotheses

Time

.69

.54

-.77

-.33

.27
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increased.

The percentage of untenable hypotheses was influenced more by

discussion over hypotheses than by discussion over problems; and focusing
reflected variation in discussion over problems more than discussion over
hypotheses.

Card choices to solution--the basic dependent measure (Laughlin

and Doherty, 1967)--however, was influenced b:, 'both discussion over problems
and discussion over hypotheses.
These results suggest that the discussion process in the concept attainment situation can be separated into different functions.

The two response

measures of focusing strategy and percentage of untenable hypotheses reflected
the different functions of discussion.

Card choices, the more basic indicator,

reflected both functions.
It seems that as subjqcts were allowed discussion over more hypotheses,
they were better able to reduce the number of mistake. made (in terms of
untenable hypotheses).

If a person who perceives an untenable hypothesis on

the part of his partner is free to correet it through verbal interaction under
discussion conditions, it follows that the more hypotheses on which discussion
1s allowed, the smaller the percentage of untenable hypotheses will be,
(providing, of course, that the mistake is perceived).

But assuming that the

perception of errors equal across all conditions, the manipulation of discussion can be seen to have direct effect on the percentage of untenable
hypotheses.

What is most important, is the fact that discussion over hypo-

theses is most responsible for the reduction of untenable hypotheses.
Aa subjects are allowed more discussion over problems, however, they are
given the opportunity to discuss more of the complete proeess.

An increase

in discussion over hypotheses does not always reflect this, but any increase
in discussion over problems reflects prior experience in solving at least
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one problem.

Discussion under these conditions, Le. after prior relevant

problem solving experience, would then, based on experience, be of a more
sophis ticated, and therefore more profitable, nature in terms of overall
strategy.
It should be noted that the results of increased discussion over problems
renorted here, i.e. increased focusing, do not imply the superiority of that
strategy over scanning, but rather only increased efficiency.

For Laughlin

and Doherty (1967) noted, discussion facilitates the effective utilization of
whatever strategy is used, whether fOCUSing, or scanning.
Tn summary, then, the discussion process in concept attainment can be
seen as having two main effects, avoidance of mistakes or untenable hypotheses,
and adoption and utilization of an efficient strategy.

While there was no

effect of discussion on time to solution, there were highly significant
transfer effects over all three problems in regard to time.

This is a curious

result in view of the fact that none of the other response measures reflected
any transfer effects.

There is some question as to whether time to solution

should be considered a response measure in terms of performance.

Laughlin and

Doherty (1967) and Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) both found fewer card choices,
lower percentages of untenable hypotheses, and more efficient use of strategies with diSCUSSion, yet more time to solution.

This paralleled the results

of Laughlin (1965) which indicated that groups required more time than
individuals.

.

This study failed to replicate this effect of discussion on time,

however, and raised some question as to what time to solution is measuring.
possible

e~lanation

A

(McGlynn, 1968) is that time, which subjects were in-

structed to ignore, may be taken as a mea»ure of organization and coordination
as much as a measure of performance.

If time is taken as a measure of
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organization, then, the results can be used to support the usual failure to
find transfer effects in selection paradigm experiments.
As Laughlin and Jordan (1967) noted:

transfer is commonly found in

reception paradigm studies (e.g. Neisser and Weene, 1962; Wells, 1962; Wells
and Watson, 1965; Haygood and Bourne, 1965), but not in selection paradigm
studies (e.g. Bruner et a1., 1956; Conant and Trabasso, 1964; Laughlin, 1966).
The failure of the present study to find any transfer effects for card
choices, focusing, or percentage of untenable hypotheses is in essential
agreement with this observation.
While the consideration of time as a measure of organization and coordination helps to clear up the situation somewhat, there is still seemingly no
explanation for the failure of the previously cited selection paradigm
experiments to find transfer effects for time to solution.

Nor does there

seem to be an explanation for the finding of the Laughlin and McGlynn (1968)
study of transfer effects for all measures, including time to solution.
The correlations between response measures are substantially the same
for individual problems and for the sum of each group's three problems.
These correlations are very close to those reported by McGlynn (1968) for
conjunctive problems given to cooperative groups.

The correlations in this

study are also in general agreement with those reported in Laughlin and
Jordan (1967) and Laughlin (1966), though somewhat higher than those of the
latter study.

In comparison with the Laughlin and Doherty (1967) study,

though, the correlations reported here are consistently much higher, with
one cemplete.'reversal.

The Laughlin and Doherty study reported a correlation

of -.33 between time to solution and card choices, whereas the present study
found a positiva eorrelation between these

~

measures of .59.

This is
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curious in view of the fact that both studies used conjunctive problems in
group situations.

Both studies also varied the amount of discussion allowed,

though the Laughlin and Doherty study used either full discussion or no
discussion conditions.
The difference in the time-card choice correlations are reflected in the
different findings of the two studf.es concerning discussion and transf.ar
effects on time to solution.

While both studies found that discussion

resulted in fewer card choices, more focusing, and lower percentage of
untenable hypotheses, the Laughlin and Doherty study found more time to
solution and the present study did not.

And while both studies found no

transfer effects in terms of card choices, strategy, or untenable hypotheses,
the Laughlin and Doherty study found no transfer effect for time to solution
either, whereas the present study did.
The agreement of these two experiments on correlations of other resp0nse
measures, at least aa to uniform direction, and the substantial similarity of
results other than those concerning time to solution raise further question
as to the consideration of time as a measure of performance ••• at least in
terms of cognitive efficiency.
Summary
The effects of varying amounts of discussion on concept attainment
strategies and interproblem transfer were investigated for three I successive
three-attribute conjunctive problems.

Using the selection presentation

method. 1ndividuals in two-person cooperative groups alternated in selecting
successive instance3 from an array
making

e8~h

conditions:

~ontaining

accompanying hypothesis.
where

diacussion~was

all possible instances and in

This alternation took place under both

or was not allowed.

The stimulus display
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was a six-qttribute, two-value systematic array of 64 cards.

t'.

repeated measures factorial design was used with the variables:

3 x 3 x 3
(1) discuss-

ion allowed on problems (first, first and second. all three), (2) discussion
allowed on hypotheses (first two, first four. first six), (3) problems
(three €or each pair).
Increasing amounts of discussion significantly decreased the number of
card choices to solution, increased the incidence of focusing, decreased the
percentage of untenable hypotheses, but had no effect on the time to solution.
Tncreases in discussion over problems and discussion over hypotheses had
different effects:

the former resulted in'reduction of the percentage of

untenable hypotheses, the latter resulted in a higher incidence of focusing,
"hile both resulted in fewer card choices to solution.
There was a highly significant transfer effect over all three problems
founu !or time to solution.

No other transfer effects were found.

It was

suggested that perhaps time might better be considered a measure of organization and cooperation within the group, rather than as a performance indicative of cognitive efficiency.
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Appendix I
Instructions
This is an experiment in thinking.

There are 64 cards on this board,

arranged in 8 rows if 8 cards each and numbered from one to 64.

These cards

are all the possible combinations made by taking six colors, .each color
being either a plus or a minus.
plus and a minus.)

(The 6 colors were pointed out, each as a

The colors are called attributes, and the plus or minus

signs are called values.
Thase c8L'ds can be grouped together or categorized in a large number of
possible ways by following a specified rule.

The rule defines a concept, and

a concept is the group of all cards that satisfy the rule.
The rule is that the card must have a particular value (plus or minus)
on one color, a particular value on another color, and a particular value on
a third color.

For example, all the cards with a

blue plus, an orange plus,

and a green minus are the concept ''blue plus, oTange plus, and green minus."
Or, all the cards with a black minus, a green plur., and s red ?lus are the

concept "black minus, ff,reen plus, and red plus."
In the problems I will have some concept in mind, and your job is to
determine what it is.

I'll start you off by giving you the number of one

of the cards that is included in the concept; that is, one of the cards that
exemplify the concept I have in mind.

Then you will select any card you

wish in order to get information as to whether the card you select is also
included in the concept.

If the card you selected is included in the concept,

I will say "yes," and if the card you selected is not included in the concept,
I will say "no".

To be included it must have all three attributes and values

specified in the rule.

(An example was given of a card that only partially
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satisfied the rule.)
Then you will make a hypothesis as to what concept you then think I have
in mind.

If your hypothesis is correct, I'll say "ves," and you've solved

the problem.

If your hypothesis is not correct, I'll say "no".

that your hypothesis is not entirely correct.
it may be partly correct.

A "no" means

It may be entirely wrong, or

(A parallel example to the one given previously

was given of a partially correct hypothesis.)
If I say "no," you select another card, and again I'll say "yes" or
"no" depending upon whether the card you select is included in the concept,
and again you will make a hypothesis and I'll say "yes" or "no" to the
hypothesis.

So, you just keep repeating the procedure of selecting a card

and making a hypothesis, selecting another card and making another hypothesis,
until you've solved the problem.
Now you're going to be working together on the problems, so you can
discuss your card choices and hypotheses all you want ••• up to a point.

After

that ••• after I tell you no more d1..scusaic,n is allowed ••• you'll still be
working together, but discussion will no longer be allowed.

To prepare for

this, you are to alternate in actually saying each card choice and hypothesis
from the beginning of each problem.

For instance, if you were to start

(pointing to one subject) you would make the first card choice and accompanying hypothesis verbally, though you might have decided upon it together.
Then it would be your turn to say the next card and hypothesis (pointing to
the other).

You must establish the pattern of alternating because at some

point during the problem I will stop the discussion after which you may not
communicate except through your card choices and hypotheses.
There are three problema in all, and the object is to solve each
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problem in the fewest number of card choices, regardless of time.
The concept rule was reiterated and the reference card placp.n in front
of the subjects.

Any questions were then answered.

At the beginning of the second and third problems subjects were told
that they could begin discUSSing again.
At:

th~ ~o1.nt

were told:

at which discussion was to end for each problem subjects

"from now on, no more discussion will be allowed; all you may

say now is card numbers and hypotheses, in turn."
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